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JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The District Court granted Summary Judgment on Count I 
of Appellants' Second Amended Complaint pursuant to a Motion of 
Respondent Utah State Engineer, and subsequently certified its 
Judgment under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-2-2(3) (f) (1987); Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; and Rule 4(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Central Utah Water Conservancy District, Salt Lake 
County Water Conservancy District and Draper Irrigation Company 
were granted leave to file a brief amicus curiae by Order of this 
Court dated November 22, 1988. Provo River Water Users Associa-
tion, Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, Weber River Water 
Users Association, Davis & Weber Counties Canal Company, Sandy 
City, Salt Lake City, Delta Canal Company, Melville Irrigation 
Company, Abraham Irrigation Company, Deseret Irrigation Company 
and Central Utah Water Company were similarly granted leave to 
file a brief amicus curiae by Order of this Court dated December 
2, 1988. These amici have coordinated their views on the issues 
discussed herein and join in this single amicus brief (hereinaf-
ter these amici will be referred to as "Water Users"). Appel-
lants will be referred to in this brief as "Bonhams-Summerhays" 
and Respondent Utah State Engineer as the "State Engineer." 
Amicus Curiae National Parks and Conservation Association will be 
referred to as "NPCA". 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issues d iscussed by Water Users are as fo l l ows : 
1 . Are the s tatutory c r i t e r i a governing the approval 
or r e j e c t i o n of appl icat ions to appropriate unappropriated water 
s e t forth in Utah Code Ann. S 73-3-8 (Cum. Supp. 1988) , appl i ca -
b l e to change appl icat ions f i l e d to change e x i s t i n g water r ights 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 73-3-3 (1981 J?1 
2. Is a non-water user e n t i t l e d to appeal a d e c i s i o n 
of the State Engineer approving a change appl ica t ion as an 
•aggrieved party," under the provis ions of Utah Code Ann. 
S 73-3-14 (1981)?2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Section 73-3-3 s t a t e s in relevant part: 
Any person e n t i t l e d to the use of water 
may change the place of d ivers ion or use and 
may use the water for other purposes than 
those for which i t was o r i g i n a l l y appropri-
ated , but no such change may be made i f i t 
impairs any vested right without jus t compen-
s a t i o n . Such changes may be permanent or 
temporary. . . . 
1
 S 73-3-3 was amended by the Utah Legislature in 1986 to allow the filing 
of change applications by the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources in certain 
limited circumstances, and amended again in 1987 to conform to the provisions 
of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). Utah Code Ann. Ch. 46b, 
Title 63 (Cum. Supp. 1988). The 1987 amendment also resulted in some 
re-organization and re-wording of this section, but the procedures and the 
substantive criterion governing changes were not changed and remain the same 
as when the subject change application was approved by the State Engineer in 
1985. 
2 Appellants initiated this proceeding prior to the implementation of 
UAPA, which became effective on January 1, 1988. Proceedings initiated before 
an administrative agency prior to that time are governed by pre-existing law. 
Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-22 (Cum. Supp. 1988). UAPA contains language similar 
to S 73-3-14 regarding aggrieved parties. Id. S 63-46b-14. Appeals from 
decisions of the State Engineer now must be taken within 30 days of the Order 
constituting final agency action as opposed to the 60 days previously allowed. 
Id. 
No permanent change shall be made except 
on the approval of an application therefor by 
the state engineer. Such applications shall 
be made upon blanks to be furnished by the 
state engineer and shall set forth the name 
of the applicant, the quantity of water 
involved, the stream or source from which the 
appropriation has been made, the point on the 
stream or source where the water is diverted, 
the point to which 11 is proposed to change 
the diversion of the water, the place, 
purpose and extent of the present use, and 
the place, purpose and extent of the proposed 
use and such other information as the state 
engineer may require* The procedure in the 
state engineer's office and rights and duties 
of the applicants with respect to applica-
tions for permanent changes of point of 
diversion, place or purpose of use shall be 
the same as provided in this title In 
applications to appropriate water; but the 
state engineer may, in connection with 
applications for permanent change involving 
only a change in point of diversion of 660 
feet or less, waive the necessity for pub-
lishing notice of such applications, • 
Appl i c r "i e i ther permanent or 
temporary changes "i.li ill not be rejected for 
the sole reason that such change would impair 
vested right of others, but if otherwise 
proper, they may be approved as to part of 
the water involved or upon the condition that 
such conflicting rights be acquired, * * . 
i l 1 • i« : , • : • .' 
S e c L J > ,l" 3 3 8 s t a t e s i i i 
111 It shall be the duty of the state 
engineer to approve an application if: (a) 
there is unappropriated water in the proposed 
source; (b) the proposed use will not impair 
existing rights or interfere with the more 
beneficial use of the water; (c) the proposed 
plan is physically and economically feasible, 
unless the application is filed by the United 
States Bureau of Reclamation, and would not 
prove detrimental to the public welfare; (d) 
the applicant has the financial ability to 
complete the proposed works; and (e) the 
application was filed in good, faith and not 
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for purposes of speculation or monopoly. If 
the state engineer, because of information in 
his possession obtained either by his own 
investigation or otherwise, has reason to 
believe that an application to appropriate 
water will interfere with its more beneficial 
use for irrigation, domestic or culinary, 
stock watering, power or mining development 
or manufacturing, or will unreasonably affect 
public recreation or the natural stream 
environment, or will prove detrimental to the 
public welfare, it is his duty to withhold 
his approval or rejection of the application 
until he has investigated the matter. If an 
application does not meet the requirements of 
this section, it shall be rejected. 
* * * 
Section 73-3-14 states in relevant part: 
In any case where a decision of the 
state engineer is involved any person 
aggrieved by the decision may within 60 days 
after notice bring a civil action in the 
district court for a plenary review 
thereof. . • • 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Water Users rely on the basic statement of the case as 
set forth in the State Engineer's Brief. However, we believe it 
is important to emphasize that this is not a water rights case as 
contemplated in the relevant statutes cited above. 
Bonhams-Summerhays do not assert the impairment of any water 
right in their Second Amended Complaint. Rather, they have 
initiated a traditional common law damage action for claimed 
flooding of real property. Those counts of Bonhams-Summerhaysf 
Second Amended Complaint asserting the damage claims have not 
been addressed by the trial court and are awaiting resolution. 
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INTEREST" ur I HE AMICUS CURIAE 
Water Users are made up of ariety 
users and suppliers of water. Thev -
fi * ii I r i in 11111 • 11 il i * "i in in in mi 1 in ' / e r g e n t g e o g r a p h i 
example, the Central Utah Water Conservancy 
Water Conservancy D i s ^ 
nrf 
1 > u i. c;» *> upp J
 s ex eat ed 
to Utah Code Ann. 
These districts 
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supplied ..sit 
Utar .edb populated counties* 
Sandv 
copulation loca***^ 
number 
•mi 
n * - auergrouna -
uset supp>ly needs .esidents «o w<=xx 
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Lake \* subs t ant i^1 nil i i i 11
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& Webe uinties r 
. *gation Compan - Canal 
pany, Mel i ompanyr Abraham * -:* Compai 
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mutual water companies organized under Utah's Non-Prof it Corpora-
tion and Cooperative Association Act to supply water to their 
stockholders. While these companies traditionally have been 
involved in supplying irrigation water to their stockholders, 
that role is changing to some degree as land within their service 
area is converted to other uses, such as residential and 
industrial. 
Water Users, as a group, own water rights represented 
by diligence rights (pre-statutory use of water), court decrees, 
applications to appropriate and certificates of appropriation. 
The economic welfare of the state depends on the ability to 
change the use of our scarce water resources to accommodate new 
growth. In this regard, an absolutely essential attribute of a 
water right is the right to change the point of diversion, place 
of use or nature of use as provided for in S 73-3-3• The issues 
raised in this appeal go to the heart of the change process. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The approval or rejection of change applications is 
governed exclusively by the clear and express provisions of S 
73-3-3, and does not include the criteria set forth in S 73-3-8 
for the allocation of unappropriated water. This conclusion is 
supported by the history of water development, the legislative 
history of the two statutes, judicial decisions of this Court and 
the long-standing interpretation of these statutes by the State 
Engineer and the Utah Bar. 
1. Historically, water rights in Utah could be 
established by merely diverting water and applying it to 
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beneficial use. In 1903, the Utah Legislature provided, for the 
first time, statutory criteria to govern the future allocation of 
the unappropriated public water supply from surface sources.. 
(Groundwater was made subject to the same allocation criteria as 
surface water in 1935.) This legislation introduced considera-
tion of the public interest as a criterion in the allocation 
process, but this criterion was, by the legislation's express 
terms, limited to the allocation of unappropriated water and was 
not applicable to changes of existing vested rights. 
2. In the same 1903 Act the Utah Legislature con-
firmed the right of water users to make changes in their water 
rights subject only to the requirement that the change not impair 
other rights on the water source. The right of change already 
had been widely recognized by numerous courts in the West as an 
inherent attribute of the water user's property right prior to 
1903. This Court in 1898, five years prior to the 1903 legisla-
tion, affirmed this fundamental right of change for Utah water 
users. The 1903 legislation did not require the water user to 
obtain anyone's permission to make a change of an existing water 
right. It required only that the water user report the change to 
the State Engineer after it had been made. 
3. Not until 1909 were Utah water users required to 
file an application with the State Engineer and receive his 
permission prior to making such a change. The 1909 Act set forth 
procedures for giving notice of the proposed change and provided 
for the filing of protests. These procedures paralleled proce-
dures contained elsewhere in the water code for applications to 
appropriate. No modification was made in the single substantive 
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requirement for approval of a change, i.e., non-impairment of 
other vested water rights. This had been by early court deci-
sions and legislation, and remained the only basis for evaluating 
a proposed change. 
4. The 1937 Legislature deleted the duplicative 
notice and protest procedures from the change statute, and 
adopted by reference the procedures for processing applications 
to appropriate since they were the same. However, this legisla-
tion left the substantive criterion (non-impairment of other 
vested water rights) intact as it always had existed. Amendments 
to the change statute since 1937 all have re-affirmed the same 
single governing criterion for approving or rejecting change 
applications using the same basic language. Thus, it is not only 
clear from the express terms of S 73-3-3 and S 73-3-8 that the 
criteria of S 73-3-8 do not apply to changes — this interpreta-
tion is fully supported by the legislative history of the two 
sections. 
5. This Court has specifically confirmed the forego-
ing interpretation of S 73-3-3 in a well-established body of case 
law. The test adopted by this Court and applied in numerous 
cases is whether there is "reason to believe" that the proposed 
change can be made without impairing other vested water rights. 
These cases fully support the inherent right of change and of 
limiting the criterion governing changes to non-impairment of 
other vested water rights as specified in S 73-3-3. No decision 
of this Court has imposed S 73-3-8 criteria on change applica-
tions. This same understanding of the provisions of S 73-3-3 has 
likewise existed over the years among members of the Utah Bar. 
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6. Long-standing and consistent agency construction 
of S 73-3-3 also supports not imposing S 73-3-8 criteria on 
change applications. The Legislature delegated the administra-
tion of Utah's water code to the State Engineer from the time it 
created the office of State Engineer in 1897 to the present day 
— a period of over 90 years. In receiving, processing and 
acting upon changes since 1909, the State Engineer uniformly has 
applied only the non-impairment standard in making decisions on 
change applications filed pursuant to S 73-3-3. 
7. The Utah Legislature has amended S 73-3-3 a number 
of times, but it has never modified the substantive criterion 
governing the approval or rejection of change applications. 
These amendments have occurred against the backdrop of the State 
Engineer's long-standing and consistent interpretation of S 
73-3-3 and in light of the decisions of this Court. In these 
circumstances, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware and 
supportive of the well-established interpretation being given 
S 73-3-3 by this Court and the State Engineer. 
8. Water right holders throughout Utah are relying on 
a well-established, predictable and functional change process to 
meet public and private water needs. Funds, especially the 
increasing use of public bond funds, can be secured for maintain-
ing and improving water use and delivery systems only under a 
settled and stable change process. The introduction of the broad 
S 73-3-8 criteria into the change process would undermine the 
stability of the change process and the viability of future water 
development. 
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9. The position of Bonhams-Summerhays and NPCA as to 
who is an Aggrieved party", and thus who is entitled to appeal a 
decision of the State Engineer under the provisions of S 73-3-14, 
is essentially tied to the success of their efforts to impose S 
73-3-8 criteria on change applications. The limitations this 
Court has placed on the scope of review of the State Engineer's 
decisions limit aggrieved parties in change cases to water rights 
holders asserting water right impairment by virtue of the pro-
posed change. This construction of S 73-3-14 also is supported 
by general case law defining aggrieved parties. 
These reasons, as more fully argued below, compel the 
conclusion that the criteria governing applications to appropri-
ate water are not applicable to change applications and that 
non-water right owners such as Bonhams-Summerhays are not 
"aggrieved parties" with a right to judicial review of the State 
Engineer's decision granting the change application. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE APPROVAL OR REJECTION OF CHANGE APPLICA-
TIONS IS GOVERNED EXCLUSIVELY BY THE CRITE-
RION SPECIFIED IN S 73-3-3 AND NOT THE CRITE-
RIA FOR ALLOCATION OF UNAPPROPRIATED WATER 
SET FORTH IN S 73-3-8. 
A. Section 73-3-8 Criteria are Limited to Allocating Unappropri-
ated Water, 
1. Pre-Statutory Water Allocation. Historicallyf a 
vested private water right could be acquired in Utah and other 
western states by merely diverting the water and placing it to 
beneficial use. Because of the arid conditions, the early 
settlers and miners could grow crops, raise livestock and extract 
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minerals only by d ivert ing the water and using i t away from the 
stream or other water source. This prac t i ce was at odds with the 
common law doctr ine of riparian r ight s that ex i s t ed in the more, 
humid Eastern S t a t e s , but i t was accepted and confirmed by both 
the courts and s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s as necessary to the sett lement 
of the West. The r e s u l t of these ear ly pract ices was the ere -
at ion of the appropriation doc tr ine . In i t s e a r l i e s t d e c i s i o n s , 
t h i s Court recognized the appropriation doctrine as the only 
bas i s for acquiring a water r ight in t h i s S ta te . Crane v . 
Winsor, 2 Utah 248, 253 (1878); Munroe v . I v i e , 2 Utah 535, 
537-38 ( 1 8 8 0 ) . 4 
2. Adoption of Water Al locat ion Cr i t er ia . As Utah's 
population increased, competition for the avai lable water supply 
a l so i n t e n s i f i e d . Exist ing users found themselves defending 
the i r e s tab l i shed uses against newcomers d ivert ing water from 
other reaches of the stream. In response to a need for c e n t r a l -
ized control and administration of the S t a t e ' s water resources , 
the Utah Legis lature created the Off ice of State Engineer in 
1897. Laws of Utah 1897, ch. 38. I n i t i a l l y , h i s dut i e s were 
l imited and not u n t i l 1903 were the State Engineer's dut i e s 
expanded to include r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for water a l l o c a t i o n . Laws of 
Utah 1903, ch. 100, SS 34-42. Thereafter, r ights to surface 
-* The evolution of the appropriation doctrine in the West i s reviewed in 
detail by Hutchins, Water Rights Laws of the Nineteen Western States, Vol. 1, 
Ch. 6-8, Misc. Pub. No. 1206, U.S. Dept. of Ag. (1971). 
* These pre-statutory rights are commonly referred to as "diligence 
rights*. Such rights could be established to surface water prior to 1903 by 
diversion and use of the water, Yardley v. Swapp, 12 Utah 2d 146, 149, 364 
P.2d 4 (1961), and to groundwater prior to 1935. Goodwin v, Tracy, 6 Utah 2d 
If 304 P.2d 964 (1956). 
-11-
water could be initiated only by filing an application with the 
State Engineer and securing his approval. 
Utah's new water code provided allocation criteria so 
that water sources would not be over-allocated to the detriment 
of existing water right holders. To better achieve this goalf 
the Legislature provided procedures for giving notice to existing 
water right holders of proposed appropriations and also substan-
tive criteria to evaluate the proposed appropriation in terms of 
both existing rights and also the general public interest. Laws 
of Utah 1903, ch. 100, S 39. 
As a separate and distinct matter, the 1903 Legislature 
confirmed the inherent right of users to change established water 
rights subject only to the non-impairment of other vested water 
rights. JtcL s 51. Users were required to give the State Engi-
neer notice of changes after they had been made, but the 
Engineer's approval was not required. IdL The evolution of 
Utah's change law is discussed in Point I.e., infra. 
3. Current Appropriation Procedures. Under existing 
statutory procedures in Utah, anyone seeking to use unappropri-
ated water must file an application with the State Engineer 
describing the proposed appropriation in detail. Utah Code Ann. 
S 73-3-2 (Cum. Supp. 1988). Notice of the proposed appropriation 
is given by publication in a local newspaper once a week for 
three weeks. Ld. S 73-3-6. Protests may be filed up to thirty 
(30) days following the last publication date. Id. S 73-3-7. 
5
 Groundwater was made subject to the same allocation procedures in 1935. 
Wrathall v. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 P.2d 755 (1935); Justesen v. Qlsen, 86 
Utah 158, 40 P.2d 802 (1935); Laws of Utah 1935, ch. 105. 
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The substantive criteria for approving or rejecting a new appli-
cation are set forth in S 73-3-8. 
4. Section 73-3-8 Criteria. In evaluating an appli-
cation to appropriate unappropriated water the State Engineer is 
to determine if: 
a. there is unappropriated water in the source; 
b. the proposed use will not impair existing 
rights or interfere with the more beneficial 
use of water; 
c. the proposed plan is physically and economi-
cally feasible and not detrimental to the 
public welfare; 
d. the applicant has the financial ability to 
complete the proposed works; 
e. the application was filed in good faith and 
not for speculation or monopoly. 
If the State Engineer has reason to believe that 
the application to appropriate will interfere with 
the more beneficial use of water (for irrigation, 
domestic, culinary, stock watering, power, mining 
development or manufacturing), or will unreason-
ably affect public recreation or the natural 
stream environment or will prove detrimental to 
the public welfare, it is the Engineer's duty to 
withhold approval of the application until he has 
investigated the matter. 
Applications that do not meet the requirements of 
S 73-3-8 are to be rejected.6 
These broad public interest criteria are reasonable and 
proper when evaluating a request to acquire a private right to a 
portion of the available public water supply. However, the 
* Once an application is approved the applicant must proceed with dili-
gence to place the water to beneficial use. Utah Code Ann. $ 73-3-12 (Cum. 
Supp. 1988). Upon submitting proof that works have been constructed and the 
water applied to beneficial use, id. $ 73-3-16, the applicant receives a cer-
tificate of appropriation. Id. $ 73-3-17. This completes the appropriation 
process. 
nature of a water right once it becomes vested and other sound 
policy reasons demonstrate that the S 73-3-8 criteria are not 
applicable to change applications. Once the broad public inter-
est is considered and the decision made to grant a private water 
right in the public water supply, the focus narrows to the 
management of the water relative to other vested water rights, 
B. Nature of the Right Acquired, 
A water user is entitled to divert and use water in 
conformance with his water right. This includes a call on the 
available water supply at his point of diversion in accordance 
with his priority, Richlands Irrigation Co, v, Westview Irriga-
tion Co,. 96 Utah 403, 418, 80 P.2d 458 (1938). While an 
appropriative right has been characterized as a right of use or 
"usufructary right", it is nevertheless considered a species of 
real property and subject to the same protections afforded other 
Q 
property rights. An incident of water right ownership is the 
right to make certain changes in the way the water is used. This 
right of change, subject only to the non-impairment of other 
water rights, always has been recognized by both court decision 
and by statute in Utah. 
C, Criterion Governing the Approval and Rejection of Change 
Applications is Specified Only in S 73-3-3 and is Limited to a 
Determination of Non-Impairment of Other Vested Water Rights, 
!• Section 73-3-3 Embodies Water Users1 Inherent 
Right of Change, Water users always have found it necessary to 
7
 Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water & Electrical Power Co,, 24 Utah 
249, 266, 67 P. 672 (1902), aff'd on reh'g, 25 Utah 456, 71 P. 1069 (1903). 
8
 In re Bear River Drainage Area, 2 Utah 2d 208, 211, 271 P.2d 846 (1954); 
see also. Hunter v. United Statesf 388 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1967). 
make changes in the use of their water rights. Such changes are 
essential to a functional water right system. A water user may 
need to change his point of diversion for any number of reasons. 
A change in diverting works may provide greater efficiency in 
using the water by diverting it closer to the place of use. A 
change in a stream channel caused by natural conditions — 
erosion or flooding — may require a small change in point of 
diversion to maintain access to the water supply. 
Other changes also may be required. A change in place 
of use may become necessary. For example, a water user may, for 
a variety of reasons, discontinue irrigating certain land and 
need to move the water to other acreage. Section 73-3-3 accommo-
dates such needs. 
One of the most significant aspects of the right to 
change involves changes in nature of use. Such changes always 
have been important, but at this late date in Utah's water 
development history, these changes take on added significance. 
In some areas of Utah, all of the water sources are fully appro-
priated, but areas continue to grow and new uses must be satis-
fied. Changes in the nature of use of water are particularly 
common as areas change from agricultural to urban. This is 
occurring rapidly along the Wasatch Front in Weber, Davis, Salt 
Lake and Utah Counties where certain Water Users supply large 
quantities of municipal and industrial water. If it were not for 
the ability to purchase existing rights no longer needed for 
agriculture use, new domestic, municipal and industrial needs 
could not be satisfied. This Court has recognized that the more 
efficient use of our limited water resources, facilitated by the 
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change process , i s necessary to the public welfare . "[A change] 
proposal , i f completed without impairing vested r i g h t s , contem-
p l a t e s the more b e n e f i c i a l use of water, a most des ired r e s u l t 
f u l l y cons i s t en t with progress and change, and r e f l e c t i n g the 
e s t a b l i s h e d po l i cy of t h i s s t a t e . " American Fork Irr iga t ion Co. 
v . Linke. 121 Utah 90, 97, 239 P.2d 188 (1951). An orderly and 
e f f i c i e n t change process i s e s s e n t i a l to implement t h i s publ ic 
p o l i c y . 
From the adoption of the appropriation system of water 
r ight regulat ion , the r ight to change the use of water was 
considered an inherent part of the water right i t s e l f . Prior to 
s ta tu tory regulat ion of the change process , users simply made 
such changes without seeking anyone's permission. When c a l l e d 
upon to consider such changes in disputes between water u s e r s , 
courts in the West concluded that the right to change was an 
inherent a t t r ibute of water r ight ownership. The only l i m i t a -
t i o n placed upon such changes by the early court d e c i s i o n s was 
9
 Many of the early change decisions are compiled and discussed in two 
water rights treatises that were published during this period. Wiel, Water 
Rights in the Western States, 3d Vol. 1, S 496-498 (1911); and Kinney, Irriga-
tion and Water Rights, 2d, Vol. 2, Ch. 48 (1912). Kinney states in $ 857: 
The law i s settled beyond al l question that 
where an appropriation has been once legally consum-
mated, or before the consummation of the right, for 
that matter, and the appropriates i s entitled to the 
use of a certain quantity of the water flowing in a 
natural stream, he may originally take out the same at 
any point on the stream that he may see f i t , if the 
vested rights of others are not injured thereby. 
Again, under the same limitation he may change his 
point of diversion at pleasure, provided in so doing 
the rights of others, either prior or subsequent in 
time to him, are not materially injured by the 
change. • • . 
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that the change could not impair other vested water rights from 
the same source* 
In 1898, this Court recognized and approved the right 
to make such changes without reference to any legislation on the 
subject. Hague v. Nephi Irrigation Co,, 16 Utah 421, 52 P. 765 
(1898). After reviewing decisions from other jurisdictions 
involving changes, this Court concluded that, "[i]t will be 
found that they all support the doctrine above stated, that one 
who is entitled to the use of water may change the point of 
diversion if the rights of subsequent appropriators are not 
affected by the change." id. at 434, 52 P. at 769. Within five 
years of this Court's decision in the Hague case, there was 
further legislative confirmation of the non-impairment standard 
as the single governing criterion for changes. 
2, Legislative Confirmation of the Right of Change, 
In 1903, as a part of the same legislation that provided statu-
tory procedures and criteria for obtaining rights to unappropri-
ated water, the Utah Legislature reaffirmed the inherent right of 
water users to change existing water rights. Laws of Utah 1903, 
ch, 100, S 51. The 1903 Act provided that a water user was 
entitled to make changes so long as other vested water rights 
were not impaired, but was required to give the State Engineer 
10
 Por example, the California Supreme Court in Junkans v. Bergln, 67 Cal. 
267, 7 P. 684 (1885), stated, Hundoubtedly one entitled to divert a quantity 
of water from a stream may take the same at any point on the stream and may 
change the point of diversion at pleasure, if the rights of others be not 
injuriously affected by the change." 
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not i ce a f t er a change had been accomplished. i d . Thus, the 
same s e s s i o n of the Legis lature that adopted s tatutory c r i t e r i a , 
including considerat ion of the publ ic i n t e r e s t , for a l l o c a t i n g 
unappropriated water a l so confirmed the inherent r ight of water 
users to make changes — subject only to non-impairment of other 
ves ted water r ights — without any regulatory c o n t r o l s . Further, 
the language of the 1903 Act acknowledging the r ight of change 
and spec i fy ing the governing c r i t e r i o n i s v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l to 
S 73-3-3 as i t e x i s t e d in 1985 when the subject change appl i ca -
12 t i o n was approved by the State Engineer. 
As Utah continued to grow and develop, so did the use 
of the S t a t e ' s water resources . By 1909, the Utah Legis la ture 
found i t des i rab le to make further refinements in the water code. 
With respect to changes f the 1909 amendment required the water 
user , pr ior to making a change, to f i l e a change appl i ca t ion with 
the State Engineer and rece ive h i s approval. Laws of Utah 1909, 
ch. 62, S 1288x24. The 1909 Act adopted the same bas ic n o t i c e 
and protes t procedures for change appl icat ions that prev ious ly 
had been adopted for appl icat ions to appropriate water. i d . 
But, the Legis lature did not in any way amend or modify the 
1 1
 The Territorial Legislature recognized a water user's right of change, 
Compiled Laws of Utah, Vol. 2, S 2782 (1888), as did the Utah Legislature in 
1897. Laws of Utah 1897, ch. 52, S 3 . Neither of these acts had any notice 
requirement. 
1 2
 Section 51 of the 1903 Act provided: 
Any person, corporation or association entitled 
to the use of water may change the place of diversion 
and may use the water for other purposes than those 
for which i t was originally appropriated, but no such 
change shall be made if i t impairs any vested right, 
without just compensation; . • . 
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non-impairment criterion as the single governing standard on 
changes. Nothing in the 1909 Act even remotely suggested that 
the criteria applicable to allocating unappropriated water should 
be extended to changes. The statutory framework and substantive 
provisions of the 1909 Act were incorporated into the 
recodification of Utah's water code in 1919. Laws of Utah 1919, 
ch. 67. The 1919 Act generally is considered to be the root of 
Utah's present water code. 
3. The 1937 Change Statute Amendment. Bonhams-
Summerhays and NPCA rely on the language of the 1937 amendment to 
the change statute to make the substantive criteria of S 73-3-8 
applicable to change applications. In 1937, the Legislature 
determined that it was not really necessary to duplicate the 
statutory notice and protest provisions for both applications to 
appropriate and change applications. Consequently, the change 
statute was amended to delete these duplicative statutory provi-
sions, but again the Legislature left undisturbed the 
long-standing substantive criterion governing changes of 
non-impairment of vested water rights. Laws of Utah 1937, ch. 
130, S 1. 
To facilitate a comparison of the pertinent part of the 
change statute as it existed prior to and after 1937, we have 
integrated the 1937 amendment into the change statute as it 
existed prior to that amendment. Deletions implemented by the 
amendment are indicated by strikeovers [ ], additions are 
indicated by underlining. 
Any person entitled to the use of water may 
change the place of diversion or use and may 
use the water for other purposes than those 
for which it was originally appropriated, but 
no such change shall be made if it impairs 
any vested right without just compensation. 
Such changes may be permanent or temporary. 
Changes for an indefinite length of time with 
an intention to relinquish the original point 
of diversion, place, or purpose of use are 
defined as permanent changes. Temporary 
changes include and are limited to all 
changes for definitely fixed periods of not 
exceeding one year. Both permanent and 
temporary changes of point of diversion, 
place, or purpose of use of water including 
water involved in general adjudication or 
other suits, shall be made in the manner 
provided herein and not otherwise. 
No permanent change [of point of diversiony 
piaee or purpose of use] shall be made except 
on the approval of an application therefor by 
the State Engineer. [Before the approval of 
any sueh application the State Engineer mustj 
at the expense of the applicant to be paid in 
advance- give notiee thereof by publication 
in some newspaper having general circulation 
within the boundaries of the river system or 
near the water souree in which the point of 
diversion of the water is loeatedy sueh 
notiee shall give] Such applications shall be 
made upon blanks to be furnished by the state 
engineer and shall set forth the name of the 
applicant, the quantity of water involved, 
the stream or source from which the appropri-
ation has been made, the point on the stream 
or source where the water is diverted, the 
point to which it is proposed to change the 
diversion of the water, the place, purpose 
and extent of the present use, and the place, 
?urpose and the extent of the proposed use Said notice shall be published at least ©nee 
a week for period of four weeks- Any person 
interested mayr at any time within thirty 
days after the last publication of said 
notieej file with the State Engineer a 
protest against the granting of the appliea-
tionr stating the reasons therefory whieh 
shall be duly considered by the State Engi-
neer and he shall approve or rejeet the 
application for ehange of point of diversionr 
plaee or purpose of user], and other such 
information as the state engineer shall 
require. The procedure in the state 
engineer's office and the rights and duties 
of the applicant with respect to applications 
for permanent changes of point of diversion, 
place or purpose of use shall be the same as 
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provided in this title for applications to 
appropriate water. 
The effect of the 1937 amendment was to replace lan-
guage setting forth several detailed procedural matters described 
in the statute with the general statement that, *[t]he procedure 
in the State Engineer's office and the rights and duties of the 
applicant with respect to applications for permanent changes of 
point of diversion, place or purpose of use shall be the same as 
provided in this title for applications to appropriate water," 
The phrase requiring prepayment by the applicant of the cost of 
publishing the notice of the filing of the change application and 
the specific requirements for publishing notice were deleted. 
Similarly, the provisions for filing a protest and the reference 
to the State Engineer's authority to consider the protest and to 
reject or approve the change application also were deleted. 
Since these procedures already were described elsewhere in the 
water code, the Legislature simply made them applicable to change 
applications by reference and deleted this repetitious language. 
By the time the change application that is the subject 
of this appeal was filed, the Legislature had added an additional 
phrase to the above-quoted sentence which allows the State 
Engineer to waive advertising, with respect to certain small 
changes in points of diversion. Laws of Utah 1959, ch. 137, S 1. 
This amendment further confirms that the Legislature considered 
the language adopted in 1937 to cover only procedural matters. 
There is no support for the argument that the 1937 
procedural amendment had the effect of making all of the substan-
tive criteria of S 73-3-8 applicable to the change process. 
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Nothing in the amendment even remotely suggests it. It is 
important to note that the single substantive criterion of 
non-impairment of other vested water rights was not modified in 
any way by the 1937 amendment and was retained just as it had 
previously existed. In light of the prior legislative history, 
it is impossible to believe that the Legislature would completely 
restructure the substantive change criterion in such an obscure 
fashion. 
4. Amendments Subsequent to 1937, The Legislature 
has amended Utah's change statute a number of times since 1937. 
In each and every one of these amendments, the Legislature has 
left undisturbed the right of the water user to make changes 
13 
subject only to not impairing other water rights. Thus, from 
1903 to the present, the Utah Legislature has set forth a consis-
tent and uniform policy on the substantive criterion governing 
change applications, and this policy, for good and sound reasons, 
has never included the criteria applicable to the allocation of 
unappropriated water set forth in S 73-3-8. 
The 1986 amendment to S 73-3-3 allowing the Division of 
Wildlife Resources (DWR) to file change applications in certain 
limited circumstances further supports the conclusion that 
non-impairment of other water rights is the only criterion that 
governs change applications. DWR is permitted to file change 
applications on certain types of water rights, acquired with 
prior legislative approval, in order to leave the water evidenced 
1 3
 Laws of Utah 1939, ch. Ill, S 1; Code of 1943, S 100-3-3; Laws of Utah 
1949, ch. 97, $ 1; Laws of Utah 1959, ch. 137, $ 1; Laws of Utah 1986, ch, 40, 
S 1; Laws of Utah 1987, ch. 161, S 289. 
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by such rights in the natural stream channel. Lavs of Utah 1986, 
ch. 40, $ 1, A change can be approved only upon an affirmative 
showing by DWR — supported by studies — that the water is 
necessary for the preservation or propogation of fish within a 
designated section of the natural channel. Id. Such changes 
cannot impair other vested water rights. id. The Legislature 
carefully tailored this language to accomplish a narrow and 
limited purpose. The very structure and limited scope of the 
1986 amendment supports the long-standing construction of S 
73-3-3. If S 73-3-8 criteria were a part of S 73-3-3, as is 
argued here by Bonhams-Summerhays and NPCA, there would not have 
been a need for such an amendment at all. 
D. The S 73-3-8 Criteria Are Inconsistent with the Change 
Process. 
The extensive criteria set forth in S 73-3-8 which 
protect both existing rights and the public interest are appro-
priate when being applied to someone seeking to acquire a right 
to the still unallocated public water supply. Utah Code Ann. 
S 73-1-1 (1981). However, attempting to apply these same broad 
criteria to changes on existing vested rights creates problems. 
A brief examination of certain of the S 73-3-8 criteria demon-
strate their inapplicability to the change application process. 
For example, a determination that there is unappropriated water 
is necessary to approve a new application since it will be 
diverting an additional quantity of water from the water source. 
Such a determination is not appropriate at all when considering a 
change application because change applications involve already 
allocated water. If this criterion were to be applied literally, 
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it could have the effect of divesting the water user of his right 
to make a change in some situations. This is so because on many 
water sources the source is fully appropriated with pending 
approved applications. If the State Engineer is required to make 
an affirmative finding on a change application that there is 
unappropriated water under such circumstances, he may be unable 
to do so. Does that mean that applicant loses the water right or 
is he simply foreclosed from making even a modest change with 
respect to his water right even though he may have a very early 
priority on the stream? This criterion is totally irrelevant to 
the change process. 
There are other illogical consequences of applying 
S 73-3-8 criteria to the change application process. Section 
73-3-8 also requires that the application not interfere with the 
more beneficial use of water for other specified purposes. Would 
this mean the State Engineer is to make a determination that the 
water covered by the change application could be more benefi-
cially used for another purpose, to reject the change on this 
basis and thus unilaterally to divest the change applicant of a 
vested water right? Logically not, but a literal reading of 
S 73-3-8 suggests such a possibility. Other questions exist. If 
the State Engineer determines the proposed change is somehow 
detrimental to the public welfare, or unreasonably affects public 
recreation or the natural stream environment could he order that 
the water be left in the stream on the same basis as when reject-
ing a new application to appropriate unallocated public water? 
It would not seem sof but these types of illogical conclusions 
and effects could occur if the position advocated by 
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Bonhams-Summerhays and NPCA is adopted by the Court• Certainly 
when one is seeking the right to appropriate a portion of the 
public water supply it is appropriate to inquire as to the 
applicant's good faith and whether the application is speculative 
or would monopolize the available water supply. But these 
matters would not apply to a change application since the water 
already has been allocated and the owner has a vested right to 
use the water. These inappropriate consequences of the position 
advocated by Bonhams-Summerhays and NPCA further demonstrate that 
if the Legislature were to attempt to apply other criteria to the 
change process, it certainly would do so in a much more specific 
and refined fashion. 
E. Judicial Confirmation of Non-Impairment Criterion Governing 
the Approval and Rejection of Change Applications Under S 73-3-3, 
This Court on a number of occasions, has considered the 
substantive criterion of S 73-3-3, and the resulting decisions 
set forth a consistent and uniform test by which change applica-
tions are measured. The test is if the evidence shows there is 
"reason to believe11 that the proposed change can be accomplished 
without impairing other vested water rights, it must be approved. 
This test embodies the relevant criterion from S 73-3-3. This 
also is the test applied by the State Engineer in his 
decision-making process and upon which water users throughout the 
state have relied when making necessary changes and committing 
funds to construct, operate and maintain facilities to utilize 
the water made available under these changes. 
- « -
In Crafts v. Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1983), this 
Court's most recent decision involving a change application, the 
"reason to believe" test again was reaffirmed: 
Thus, it is the State Engineer's obligation, 
before approving a change application, to 
determine that no vested water right will be 
impaired by the proposed change. On plenary 
review, the trial court has the same obliga-
tion. This Court has described the standard 
for that determination as follows: 
If the evidence shows that 
there is reason to believe that the 
proposed change can be made without 
impairing vested rights the appli-
cation should be approved. The 
owner of a water right has a vested 
right to the quality as well as the 
quantity which he has beneficially 
used. A change application cannot 
be rejected without a showing that 
vested rights will thereby be 
substantially impaired. While the 
applicant has the general burden of 
showing that no impairment of 
vested rights will result from the 
change, the person opposing such 
application must fail if the 
evidence does not disclose that his 
rights will be impaired. 
Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs Water 
Users Ass'n. 2 Utah 2d 141, 143-44, 270 P.2d 
453, 455 (1954) (citations omitted). 
667 P.2d at 1070. (Emphasis added). 
The Boundary Springs Water Users Ass'n case quoted with 
approval in Crafts was not the first time this Court applied the 
"reason to believe" test to change applications. In United 
States v. District Court. 121 Utah 18, 242 P.2d 774 (1952), the 
Court concluded that: 
If there is reason to believe that only 
a part of the waters covered by the applica-
tion may be diverted at the proposed new 
diversion place without interfering with the 
rights of others but there is no reason to 
believe that all of such waters could be so 
_0«-
diverted, the Engineer in the first place and 
the court on appeal should approve the 
application to change the diversion place of 
only such amount of water as there is reason 
to believe may be changed without impairing 
the rights of others regardless of the amount 
specified in the application* 
242 P.2d at 775* A number of intervening cases between Boundary 
Springs Water Users Ass'n and Crafts have also specifically 
applied the "reason to believe" test. See East Bench Irrigation 
Co. v. Deseret Irrigation Co,. 2 Utah 2d 170, 175, 271 P.2d 449 
(1954), which was decided less than three weeks after the Bound-
ary Springs case; Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Co. v. Linke. 
5 Utah 2d 53, 296 P.2d 723, 724 (1956); East Bench Irrigation Co. 
v. State. 5 Utah 2d 235, 238, 300 P.2d 603, (1956); Piute Reser-
voir & Irrigation Co. v. West Panguitch Irrigation and Reservoir 
Co.. 12 Utah 2d 168, 172, 364 P.2d 113 (1961); rev'd on other 
grounds on reh'g. 13 Utah 2d 6, 8, 367 P.2d 855 (1962). All of 
the opinions of this Court consistently and uniformly have 
applied only the non-impairment criterion when reviewing a State 
Engineer's decision on a change application. 
The interpretation placed on S 73-3-3 by this Court is 
also the long-standing interpretation of the Utah Bar. In a 
recent decision construing the Married Woman's Act, this Court 
relied on the settled understanding of the Act by the Utah Bar in 
refusing to modify the existing statutory interpretation. 
Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 740 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1987). 
"(T]he fact remains that if we depart from [prior cases inter-
preting the Act], we will change the interpretation of the Act 
that has been settled insofar as the bar is concerned for almost 
90 years. This certainly argues for adhering to [prior cases] on 
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the ground that the interpretation they ref lect has become a part 
of the law." i d . at 1285. This conclusion i s equally applicable 
to the interpretation of S 73-3-3. 
Utah's statute on changes i s not unique. Other western 
states generally follow a similar course. "It i s well se t t l ed in 
the western s tates that the right to divert water is a property 
right that i s not restricted to a particular location." Clark, 
Waters and Water Rights. Vol. 5f S 412.1 (1972) c i t ing governing 
14 
state statutes and recent cases. A very recent case from the 
New Mexico Court of Appeals addresses the issue raised in th i s 
appeal. The New Mexico water code allows the State Engineer to 
consider the public interest in considering applications to 
appropriate unallocated water, but allows changes subject only to 
being not detrimental to existing water r ights . Accordingly, the 
New Mexico State Engineer had never considered the public inter-
est criterion to be applicable to change applications. In 
1 4
 A review of the water codes of other Western States, with some excep-
tions, reveals change statutes similar to Utah's. Ariz. Rev. Stat. S 45-172 
(1987); Cal. Water Code SS 1700-05 (1971), SS 1725-45 (Cum. Supp. 1988) (a 
change in place, purpose of use or point of diversion in conjunction with a 
transfer of the water right i s subject to additional analysis); Colo. Rev. 
Stat. S 37-92-302 (Cum. Supp. 1988); Kan. Stat. Ann. SS 42-304 (1986), 
82a-708b (1984); N.M. Stat. Ann. S 72-5-24 (1985); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. 
S 61-04-15.1 (1985); Okla. Stat. Ann. ch. 82, SS 105.22, .23 (Cum. Supp. 
1989); Ore. Rev. Stat. SS 540.510-.530 (1987); Wash. Rev. Code SS 90.03.380, 
•390 (1987). In al l of these states, the right to change has been confirmed, 
subject only to not impairing other vested water rights. Id. In Idaho, Mon-
tana, Nevada, and Wyoming, the traditional non-impairment criteria i s supple-
mented by consideration of other factors, including the general public inter-
est. Idaho Code. Aim. SS 42-108, -222 (Cum. Supp. 1988) (change must be in 
local public interest); Mont. Rev. Code S 85-2-402 (1987) (change must be a 
"reasonable use*); Nev. Rev. Stat SS 533.345, .370 (1986) (change application 
that threatens to be detrimental to the public interest shall be rejected); 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. S 41-3-104 (1977) (consider al l facts pertinent to the change, 
including economic losses to the community and state). However, in each of 
these instances, the additional criteria are expressly stated in the state 
statute. Id. 
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rejecting the same argument that is being asserted here by 
Bonhams- Summer hays and NPCA, the New Mexico Court in In Re 
Application of Sleeper. 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. App. 1988) ruled: 
It is conceded that the state engineer 
has traditionally and consistently construed 
Section 72-5-7 to apply only to applications 
for unappropriated water, and that Sections 
72-5-23 and -24 apply to transfers of exist-
ing rights, and allow him to deny a proper 
application for transfer only if it would be 
detrimental to other existing water rights. 
Long-standing administrative constructions of 
statutes by the agency charged with adminis-
tering them are to be given persuasive 
weight, and should not be lightly 
overturned. . . . [T]he more long-standing 
the state engineer's interpretation of 
construction of the statutes without amend-
ment by the legislature, the more likely that 
the state engineer's interpretation reflects 
the legislature's intent. 
Case law also supports the state 
engineer's interpretation of the statute. 
"Inherent in a water right is the right to 
change the place of diversion, subject only 
to the requirement that the rights of other 
water users not be injured or impaired 
thereby." [Citing New Mexico cases.] 
* * * 
We will not distort the plain geography of a 
statutory scheme to find Protestants' con-
struction. The statutes in force at the time 
of the Application did not allow denial of 
the requested transfer on the basis of the 
general "public interest" considerations. 
760 P.2d at 791. 
This decision is fully applicable here. Specifying 
statutory criteria for the change process is a policy matter for 
the Legislature, subject, however, to the users' vested private 
property right in the water. If someone desires to modify the 
long-standing legislative policy in Utah on the right of change, 
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those arguments should be addressed to the Utah Legislature, not 
this Court. 
F. The Authority Cited by Bonhams-Summerhays and NPCA Does 
Not Support the Conclusion They Urge Upon the Court. 
Bonhams-Summerhays and NPCA assert that the substantial 
body of Utah case lav is flawed because this Court has not, in 
express terms, stated that the criteria set forth in S 73-3-8 are 
not applicable to change applications. The Court has not made 
that statement because there is no reason to do so. Section 
73-3-3 constitutes a clear, unequivocal legislative expression, 
fully supported by the legislative history of the change statute, 
that the single governing criterion for change applications is 
non-impairment of other vested water rights as expressly stated 
therein. This Court, from the beginning, viewed S 73-3-3 as 
providing only a non-impairment criterion. There is no reason to 
reach out and list matters that are not applicable to the subject 
matter of the case. 
The cases relied upon by Bonhams-Summerhays and NPCA do 
not detract from the holdings in the change cases discussed and 
cited above. They rely on the dissenting opinion in Movie v. 
Salt Lake City. Ill Utah 201, 176 P.2d 882 (1947), and it was not 
even a change case. It involved the application of eminent 
domain concepts to determine the value of water temporarily taken 
in a condemnation action that was subsequently dismissed. 
Nothing in the majority opinion is at odds with this Court1 s 
decisions on the criterion governing change applications. In 
Tanner v. Humphreys. 87 Utah 164, 48 P.2d 484 (1935) and United 
States v, Caldwell, 64 Utah 490, 231 P.434 (1924), this Court 
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based i t s dec i s ions squarely on whether i t be l ieved the proposed 
change and exchange would impair other vested r ights* References 
to i s o l a t e d phrases from these opinions do not overcome the fac t 
that the Court in each case applied the same non-impairment 
c r i t e r i o n i t always has r e l i e d on in change appl icat ion c a s e s . 
Reliance on Wavman v . Murray Ci ty . 23 Utah 2d 97, 458 P.2d 861 
(1969) i s a l s o misplaced. The d i scuss ion in Wayman regarding 
e f f i c i e n c y of use and reasonableness of d ivers ion works was a l l 
d irected toward achieving the maximum b e n e f i c i a l use of the 
ava i lab le water supply even i f i t required users to expend funds 
to modernize t h e i r means of d i v e r s i o n . I t i s a l s o confined to 
the i ssue of impairment of other ves ted water r i g h t s . 
The Administrative Al locat ion of Water Study referred 
to by NPCA dea l t primarily with the a l l o c a t i o n of unappropriated 
water rather than the change appl icat ion process . Furthermore, 
the authors e x p l i c i t l y support the users 1 inherent r ight of 
change subject only to non-impairment of other ves ted water 
15 
r i g h t s . More importantly, however, t h i s study recognized that 
the po l i cy aspects of t h i s i s sue are l e g i s l a t i v e in nature. In 
t h i s regard, l e g i s l a t i o n was introduced in Utah on two separate 
1 5
 "The best approach i s to improve and clarify the guidelines for state 
administrative officials in allocating water rights so that the full range of 
the public interest will be represented in economic development as well as 
preservation of environmental, recreational and esthetic values. Once al l of 
these considerations are placed in balance, thoroughly reviewed, and water 
rights allocated, then those rights, whether granted in perpetuity or however 
specifically limited or defined, should be freely marketable subject only to 
the condition that changes and transfers do not interfere with other vested 
rights. Thus, administrative allocation i s the best procedure for vesting 
rights in the water resource and the market is the best mechanism for 
re-allocating the water resource to other users or uses to satisfy the needs 
that subsequently may arise." Clyde and Jensen, Administrative Allocation of 
Water, National Water Commission, at 100 (1971). 
occasions following this study to further strengthen the public 
interest criterion in allocating unappropriated water, even 
though that criterion was already in S 73-3-8. Each time the 
legislation was defeated. If the Utah Legislature would not even 
strengthen the public interest criterion in allocating unappro-
priated water, it is hard to infer that it silently impressed 
that concept on vested water rights through the change applica-
tion process in the manner being argued by Bonhams-Summerhays and 
NPCA. 
Apparently unhappy with the facts of the case, NPCA 
attempts to ply this Court with a more enticing example — 
changes that could conceivably affect Zion National Park. These 
changes have not been approved and have been protested by the 
United States Park Service and Bureau of Land Management (BLM). 
The Park Service protest asserts that its claimed federal 
reserved water rights for Zion Park may be impaired, if the 
change application is granted. The change application process is 
available to address this matter. The BLM protest simply puts 
the applicant on notice that BLM will have something to say about 
the use of the federal land involved. Also, it must be remem-
bered that federal laws exist to address environmental matters 
involving federal property. 
NPCA raises the specter of abuse of the change process 
by applicants obtaining the approval of an application to appro-
priate water at one site and then moving to a more sensitive site 
16
 S.B. 291, 41st Reg. Sess., Utah Leg. (1975), Senate Journal, p. 1331 
(1975); and S-B. 145, 43d Reg. Sess., Utah Leg. (1979), Senate Journal, p. 
1538 (1979). 
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under less stringent change criteria, and attempts to convert 
Tanner v. Bacon. 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943), into a change 
case* The hypothetical posed by NPCA merely demonstrates the 
wisdom for applying the more comprehensive criteria at the 
allocation stage. Section 73-3-8 criteria exist to address this 
very issue. Applications filed in bad faith and for speculative 
purpose are not to be approved. Utah Code Ann. S 73-3-8(1) (e) 
(Cum. Supp. 1988). It is just as easy to speculate on examples 
of problems if NPCA's position is adopted. For example, a water 
user may need to file a change to restore his diversion facili-
ties that were washed out by flood water. Under the wide ranging 
criteria of S 73-3-8, such a change may be denied and the user 
could lose the water right. See also Point I.D. supra. Specula-
tion about such matters should not determine this case. The Utah 
Legislature has set the policy of the State on this issue. If 
Bonhams-Summerhays and NPCA desire a change in the existing 
statutes they should address their concerns to the Legislature. 
G. Lonq-Standinq Administrative Practice Supports Limiting 
Change Criterion to S 73-3-3. 
Construing S 73-3-3 to limit a change only if other 
vested water rights are impaired is supported by well-established 
and long standing administrative practice. Under such circum-
stances, this Court has accorded deference to agency action. 
Coleman v. Utah State Land Board. 17 Utah 2d 14, 403 P.2d 781, 
784 (1965) (deference is due to agency interpretation of which 
leasing procedure should be applied to lands acquired from the 
federal government). Deference will be accorded to an adminis-
trative agency's interpretation of a statute where the statute is 
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ambiguous, Coleman. 403 P.2d at 784, and where the agency's 
technical expertise is helpful in construing the statute. Adkins 
v. Division of State Lands. 719 P.2d 524, 526 (Utah 1986). This 
Court has found this rule of construction applicable in a number 
of situations. Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheeting Co.. 717 P.2d 
718, 720 (Utah 1986) (deference is due to agency decision on 
whether social security maximum earning limit should be used to 
establish disability compensation); Bayle v. Board of Review, 700 
P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1985) (deference is due to agency decision 
that applicant is not entitled to unemployment compensation for 
the period for which she received accumulated vacation pay); 
Wells Fargo Armored Service Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 
626 P.2d 450, 451 (Utah 1981) (deference is due to agency con-
struction of statute granting an exemption from regulation to 
certain businesses); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v, State Tax Commis-
sion, 566 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah 1977) (deference is due to agency 
interpretation of statutory definition of affiliated companies 
for tax purposes). Of course, pure questions of law are reserved 
for the courts. Adkins. 719 P.2d at 526. 
Deference to agency construction is particularly 
appropriate here. From the beginning, the Legislature assigned 
to the State Engineer the primary role in administering Utah's 
water code. The State Engineer was delegated the responsibility 
for processing both applications to appropriate and change 
applications. He determines if the applications submitted are in 
order, gives notice by advertising and hears any protests that 
are filed. The State Engineer then applies the applicable 
statutory criteria and either approves or rejects the 
-34-
applications. While his decisions are subject to judicial 
review, most are not appealed. Significantly, from the adoption 
of Utahfs water code until today, the State Engineer has never 
once considered the S 73-3-8 criteria to be applicable to change 
applications. This long-standing administrative interpretation 
is correct and should be affirmed. 
H. Legislative Endorsement of Judicial and Agency Interpre-
tation. 
During the same period that this Court and the State 
Engineer have been construing S 73-3-3, the Legislature has 
amended and readopted this statute a number of times. Point 
I.C., supra. But, the Legislature has never modified the sub-
stantive criterion governing changes. These circumstances create 
a presumption that the Legislature agreed with the long-standing 
interpretation of S 73-3-3 by both this Court and the State 
Engineer. 
In American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 
1984), this Court stated: 
where the legislature amends a portion of a 
statute, leaving other portions unamended, or 
re-enacts a portion without change, absent 
substantial evidence to the contrary, the 
legislature is presumed to have been satis-
fied with prior judicial constructions of the 
unaltered portions of the statute and to have 
adopted these constructions as consistent 
with its intent. 
Id. at 3. The presumption of legislative approval is especially 
strong where, as here, the interpretation and practice have 
persisted for a long time without any legislative correction or 
change. Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County. 568 P.2d 738, 741-42 
(Utah 1977) (court would not change practice in effect under a 
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statute adopted in 1898 after nearly 80 years of implementation)• 
In such circumstances, this Court has stated that it will leave 
the luxury of changing the time-honored interpretation of the 
statute to the Legislature. Black Bull. Inc. v. Industrial 
Commission. 547 P.2d 1334, 1336 (Utah 1976) (30 years of imple-
mentation will not be changed without legislative action). This 
Court should not, at this late date, modify the interpretation of 
the change application statute employed by the State Engineer and 
the Utah Bar, adopted by this Court and approved by the 
Legislature. 
II. A NON-WATER USER IS NOT ENTITLED TO APPEAL A 
CHANGE APPLICATION DECISION OF THE STATE 
ENGINEER AS AN "AGGRIEVED PARTY" UNDER 
S 73-3-14. 
Section 73-3-14 permits any person aggrieved by a 
decision of the State Engineer to appeal that decision. This 
issue has been extensively briefed by the State Engineer and it 
is neither necessary nor appropriate to repeat that discussion in 
this brief. We concur in the arguments advanced by the State 
Engineer and submit only the following summary observations on 
this point. 
1. The position of Bonhams-Summerhays and NPCA on 
aggrieved parties is tied to the success of their effort to 
impose S 73-3-8 criteria on change applications. Failing in this 
effort, there is no basis to argue that a non-water user could be 
an aggrieved party entitled to appeal a decision on a change 
application. These parties seem to concede as much. 
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2. This Court has held on a number of occasions that 
the scope of review from decisions of the State Engineer is 
narrowly restricted to those matters which the State Engineer 
could consider in the first instance. 
The statutes governing these actions, 
U.C.A., 1953, SS 73-3-14 & 15, specify that a 
party aggrieved by a decision of the State 
Engineer is entitled to "plenary review" in 
the district court, and that "[t]he hearing 
in the district court shall proceed as a 
trial de novo and shall be tried to the court 
as other equitable actions," The issues at 
such hearings are, however, strictly limited 
to those which were, or could have been, 
raised before the State Engineer, 
Crafts v, Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1983) (emphasis 
added). Since the State Engineer can consider only whether the 
proposed change impairs other vested water rights under S 73-3-3 
and not the broader criteria of S 73-3-8, the District Court was 
likewise restricted. 
The claims asserted by Bonhams-Summerhays in this case 
are all claims based on alleged flood damage, and not water right 
impairment. The trial court correctly concluded it could 
consider only water right impairment in an appeal from a State 
Engineer's decision approving a change application. This result 
is not only supported by the decisions of this Court in the 
above-cited cases, it is fully consistent with cases from other 
jurisdictions defining aggrieved parties in other circumstances 
as discussed in the State Engineer's brief. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 73-3-8 criteria should not be imposed by this 
Court on change applications filed pursuant to S 73-3-3. The 
clear and express language of these sections, supported by 
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extensive legislative history, mandate this conclusion. This 
interpretation is confirmed by numerous decisions of this Court 
and reflects the long-standing interpretation of the State 
Engineer and the Utah Bar. 
Since S 73-3-3 is limited to a determination of water 
right impairment, a non-water user cannot be considered an 
aggrieved party entitled to appeal a decision of the State 
Engineer approving a change application. 
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